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1. Abstract 
After a decade of unsuccessful efforts to migrate informal businesses to South 
Africa’s formal economy there remains little understanding of the dynamics in this 
sector, especially as regards micro-enterprises. International literature discusses 
‘exit’ and ‘exclusion’, holding that poor law enforcement is the reason for the 
persistence and growth of the informal economy. Through examining the informal 
liquor retail (“shebeen”) sector, we demonstrate that enforcement actually produces 
informality in this sector. Illustrated with examples from one of our sites in Delft 
South, Cape Town, the article describes key aspects of shebeen business practice, 
including the responses to greater law enforcement. Notably, instead of closing shop 
or facing the hurdles of compliance, the great majority of shebeens continue to evade 
the law by downscaling their activities. This finding has implications, not just for 
liquor policy in South Africa, but for understanding both theories of formalisation 
and theories of the informal economy. 
Keywords: 
informal economy, regulatory framework, unlicensed liquor retailing, exclusion, law 
enforcement 
 
2. Introduction 
It has been estimated there are between 190,000-265,000 informal liquor retailers, 
or shebeens, in South Africa (Devey et al. 2003 – Labour Force Survey data; 
Charman 2006; Petersen & Charman 2010). Notably, the great majority of products 
sold in South African shebeens are legally manufactured by formal, regulated 
businesses (A&T Consulting, 2005). 
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However as the vast majority of shebeens operate without a state license and almost 
always in violation of various municipal zoning regulations and by-laws, they are 
both informal and illegal enterprises. Indeed, recently the Western Cape provincial 
government passed new liquor legislation that sets tough new criteria for the 
formalisation of alcohol retailing in the province, not least due a concern for the 
health and social impacts of alcohol abuse (see Charman, Piper & Petersen 
forthcoming a). Other provinces are pursuing a similar legislative process and since 
2009 both the Western Cape and Gauteng have experienced intensified policing 
around liquor retail in economically poor residential areas where the great majority 
of these enterprises are located (Charman, Petersen & Piper forthcoming). 
Consequently, the policy implementation around shebeens offers a unique 
opportunity to gain insight into state enforcement around informal businesses and 
its impact on the South African economy. 
Based on extensive evidence from across South Africa, and illustrated here through 
research in Delft South, Cape Town, we demonstrate how this attempt has resulted in 
enforced informalisation. Indeed since the legislation has taken effect, not only have 
few shebeeners migrated into the formal system, but the vast majority have remained 
informal enterprises, rather improving and developing new coping strategies to 
better evade law enforcement. In this context, the net result has been to criminalise a 
key livelihood, and worsen relations between police and shebeeners through ongoing 
raiding, confiscation and harassment. It has also created an environment conducive 
to corruption. In addition to offering new insights into a prominent enterprise, an 
important contribition given the ‘paucity of research on those enterprises that do 
exist’ (Neves & Du Toit 2012: 132), our argument sheds light on recent theories of 
formalisation. We show how, contrary to Kanbur (2009, 2012), the enforcement of 
new laws does not necessarily lead to formalisation or avoidance, but can lead to 
even more wide-scale and pernicious forms of evasion. In our view this is because of 
the failure of government to understand the cost-benefit analysis that shebeeners 
have undertaken to continue operating their businesses despite the new legislative 
environment. In this regard, we would also disagree with Gelb et al (2009), that the 
barrier of skills shortages serve as key reasons for the failure of business 
formalisation in South Africa – at least in respect of shebeens. 
Indeed, through emphasising the centrality of formal law and policy, and its’ 
disconnect from the lived reality of people engaged in the informal economy, this 
paper speaks to global debates about the nature of informality. The historical role of 
the state in forcing black business out of the alcohol retail sector, and current 
initiatives now reinforcing this legacy, demonstrate that the enduring informalisation 
of shebeens, and its increasingly pernicious character, is a direct response to state 
actions. 
3. Informality and Formalisation in Theory 
The notion of the informality, in its early articulation, focused on the presence of 
economic activities outside state regulatory frameworks. Hart (1973), for instance, 
characterised the informal sector (economy) as “unregulated economic enterprises or 
activities”. It is important to note that this paper focuses only on one form of micro-
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enterprise, and while these are central to the informal economy, this is only one of 
many different kinds. In respect of the definition of micro-enterprises we note that 
the National Small Business Act 1996, and Amendment Act (26 of 2003) considers 
such to refer to businesses employing <5 persons, have a turnover of <R200,000 
($28,571) and assets worth <R100,000 ($14,285). Informal micro-enterprises are 
‘businesses that are not registered in any way… small in nature… and operated from 
homes, street pavements and other informal arrangements” (Statistics South Africa 
Labour Force Survey: March 2007). Small in size and relatively poor in business 
assets, informal micro-enterprises are characterised by their reliance on extended 
family networks to provide access to capital and labour often on terms that usually 
cannot be matched in the formal economy (Collins et al 2009). This aspect of 
informal self-employment in South Africa closely reflects evidence from Latin 
America (Perry et al. 2007). 
The broader informal economy also includes informal forms of labour outside of 
microenterprises such as self-employment and forms of consumption - legal or 
otherwise. Generally the informal economy is typified by low entry requirements in 
terms of capital and professional qualifications; a small scale of operation; skills 
often acquired outside of formal education; labour-intensive methods of production 
and adapted technology. As Castells and Portes (1989:15) note, the most significant 
generalisations to be drawn about the informal economy are first, that the informal 
economy is universal, as similar arrangements are found in places at very different 
levels of development; second, that this sector is heterogeneous, as the forms 
adopted by unregulated production and distribution vary widely even within 
societies; and, third, that there has been an apparent increase of these activities in 
recent times. 
As to the nature and causes of the informal economy, there are several theoretical 
approaches. Thus according to Meagher (1995:261) the neo-liberal economists of the 
1950s and 1960s, and Marxist writers of the 1970s, shared the view that the informal 
sector consisted of traditional activities offering only bare survival on the margins of 
developing societies (Leys, 1973). Against this ‘traditional legacy’ view, dualist 
scholars saw the informal economy as a separate marginal economy not directly 
linked to the formal economy, providing income or a safety net for the poor (Becker 
2004:7). Indeed, this view is not dissimilar to Thabo Mbeki’s dual economy narrative 
of the late 1990s. The structuralist view cast the informal economy as linked, but 
subordinated to, the formal economy such that, for example, privileged capitalists 
aimed to subordinate petty producers and traders (Castells and Portes 1989). While 
sharing the structuralist view of the practical falseness of the formal/informal 
economic dichotomy, Roy (2005:148-152) argues that informality can be seen to be 
the expression of different sovereignties of spaces that are connected to each other 
economically. Following Agamben (1998:18), it is not the ‘chaos that precedes order, 
but rather the situation that results from its suspension.’ In a related, if more legal, 
vein scholars like De Soto (1989) see the informal economy as a rational response by 
micro-entrepreneurs to over-regulation by government bureaucracies; and a source 
of innovation and entrepreneurship rather than marginality. 
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While it is beyond the scope of this paper to engage systematically with this wide 
range of theories, our findings do speak to the notion of the intimate economic 
linkages between informal and formal business, given that the vast majority of 
products sold in shebeens are drawn from the formal economy. In addition, notions 
of rational cost-benefit analysis clearly inform the behaviour and self-understanding 
of shebeeners. The spatialisation of order with different rules applying to different 
parts of the city, and the over-regulation of the shebeen sector are all evident too. 
While it is not possible to generalise from the case of shebeens to other micro-
enterprises in poor areas, and certainly not the informal economy more widely, there 
is a profound sense in which the existence and nature of the shebeen sector in South 
Africa is a consequence of politics and policy rather than economic marginalization 
or market-driven logics. At the end of the day it is instructive to remember that what 
remains in contention is not the nature of the products that are sold in shebeens 
(legally manufactured liquor), but rather by whom it is sold, and in what space. 
This point brings us to the issue of formalisation – that is the process by which 
informal and sometimes illegal enterprises and activities can be brought into the 
formal system. The apparent persistence of informality in South Africa gained 
heightened political attention when, in the late 1990s, former President Thabo Mbeki 
referred to the notion of a second economy and the state responded in policies and 
programmes which sought to ‘migrate’ informal businesses across the formal frontier 
(Devey et al. 2006). After a decade, this migration has largely failed, with recent 
evidence suggesting that the informal economy has actually continued expanding 
(Wills 2009). How are we to understand this failure? Writing on the case of 
employment law in India, Kanbur (2009, 2012) proposes that the persistence of 
informality can be explained by the non-enforcement of regulations, especially in the 
case of enterprises that are non-compliant, evade the law and operate illegally. He 
argues that the challenge is largely one of enforcement. Assuming a context of 
informality, Kanbur conceptualises four possible positions as regards the standing of 
enterprises: A) compliant enterprises, B) enterprises that evade compliance, for 
example ignoring the law, C) enterprises that avoid compliance through adjustment 
so that the law does not apply to them, and D) enterprises that fall outside the 
regulatory framework. 
Kanbur’s argument is that enforcement of informality compels those enterprises 
positioned in B to either become compliant (A) or to adjust their operations to avoid 
regulatory controls, in other words move to C position. However, in the case of 
shebeens in South Africa, the enthusiastic application of law in all our research sites 
caused very little migration of evasive shebeeners to compliance. It has also not 
resulted in avoidance, as this is not possible. Instead shebeeners have found 
increasingly covert ways to evade enforcement, including building the costs of stock 
confiscation and bribery into the running of the business. The reasoning is 
straightforward. As compliance is practically impossible for all but a handful of 
enterprises (primarily due to municipal land use regulations), most shebeeners 
choose to manage intensified law enforcement impacts on their business rather than 
go out of businesses altogether and lose their livelihood. The point for Kanbur, is that 
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his model only works, when the policy enforcement aligns with real-world incentives. 
This is not the case with shebeens and the law in South Africa.  
4. Informality and Shebeens in South Africa 
South Africa has a formal/informal economy divide similar to most developing 
economies, though particularly characteristic of the larger economies of Latin 
America. In this way South Africa is more like Latin America than other African 
countries as the formal economy is highly regulated and modernised, accounting for 
about 90% of the countries’ gross domestic product and 60% of employment (Wills 
2009). Devey et al. (2006) proposes that the informal economy accounts for 10% of 
all domestic economic activity, though discrepancy between labour force survey data 
and national accounts (see Wills 2009) indicates potential underreporting (Ligthelm 
2006) indicates a lower figure). Informality provides employment and 
entrepreneurial opportunities to an estimated 25% of the labour force regarded as 
formally unemployed as well as additional opportunities for many of the under-
employed. 
Whilst the range and characteristics of informal sector workers has received careful 
analysis, the reasons why so many informal micro-enterprises remain small and 
informal are less clearly understood. 
Also significant is that the scope and scale of informal micro-enterprises continues to 
grow in most developing countries and South Africa (Neves & Du Toit 2012; Sinha & 
Kanbur 2012). The reasons for continued growth of South Africa’s informal economy 
and proliferation of micro-enterprises are poorly understood, and there remains a 
paucity of theorisation. One exception is the argument informal enterprises reflect 
low productivity (and low skills) and that this stands in the way of their formalisation 
(Gelb et al. 2009). In countries where the state is weak and formal institutions 
(including the financial sector) are poorly developed, as in the Least Developed 
Countries, the reasons why informal micro-enterprises remain informal are self-
evident. Yet in developing nations, like South Africa, where the state is comparably 
strong and institutions well developed (and largely accessible and efficient) the 
answer is less obvious (Gelb et al. 2009). There remains a strongly held belief, among 
both economists and policy makers, that the strength of the disincentives must be 
considered, both in terms of the capacity of the state to implement regulations, and 
the severity of punishments for transgressors. Strong disincentives and rigorous 
enforcement (added to strong formalising incentives), it is held, have the potential to 
leverage a shift of informal micro-enterprises into the formal sector. However, as we 
shall demonstrate below, despite substantial police enforcement over the last few 
years, shebeens continue to evade the law. Disincentives, it seems, are not enough. 
In our view at the heart of this failure lie fundamental misconceptions about the 
reasons for informality. As the Latin American scholarship has shown, informality is 
not simply a case of either ‘exclusion’ by, or ‘exit’ from, formal market or state, 
though these processes must be carefully understood, but a ‘multidimensional 
phenomenon’, with business owners interacting with the state at different levels in 
different spaces and across time, resulting in a ‘large grey area’ between formality 
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and informality (Perry et al. 2007). To relate this to the preceding discussion, 
formalisation will also require getting the incentives right, so that the choice to go the 
legal route makes sense for shebeeners. It seems reasonable to conclude, that only 
when this is done, perhaps by making the barriers to formalisation less high, will 
enforcement start to follow the logic that Kanbur identifies. 
South Africa has a well-established and internationally competitive liquor industry, 
manufacturing and marketing a range of liquor products (beer, wine, spirits and 
sugar fermented beverages) (A&T Consulting, 2005). Critically, in volume terms, the 
informal liquor market is considerably larger than the formal, accounting for 
approximately 90% of beer volume and 50% of standard wine volume sold annually 
(A&T Consulting, 2005). The formal liquor market, which includes all licensed 
outlets, comprising bars and taverns, retail stores, restaurants and clubs, developed 
historically to provide liquor to white persons and whilst now catering to all South 
Africans, the majority of licensed liquor outlets remain spatially located in 
commercial business sites and high streets in middle class (largely white) residential 
suburbs. The informal liquor market, in contrast, arose in response to the demand 
among black South Africans for access to liquor, and especially, within their sites of 
residence. Notably, the endurance of shebeens and their effectiveness in filling an 
unmet demand for liquor and recreational space in black townships (Rogerson & 
Hart 1986) provided the foundation for the growth of the South African Breweries 
into a corporate superpower. 
Shebeens thus have their roots in the respective segregationist (c1920-1948) and 
Apartheid (1948-1994) era controls to manage black townships by keeping liquor out 
of these areas, or controlling supply to raise money for the administration of black 
areas (la Hausse 1988; Mager 1999). The informal liquor market was thus directly 
influenced by discriminatory racial laws that sought to reduce the number of venues 
where black persons could acquire liquor, and also the forms of liquor they could 
purchase. At the local level shebeens fulfil a role as both drinking establishments and 
public spaces in which people could meet and socially interact (Rogerson & Hart 
1986; Charman, Piper and Petersen. forthcoming).  
Most of the early shebeen owners were women (often single headed households) who 
sold liquor to sustain their families within the limited Apartheid labour market. Since 
these origins shebeens have served as potential business incubators for the 
accumulation of skills and as a vital income source, often run by “solid housewives 
and respectable men” (Nakasa, in Rogerson & Hart 1986). The entrepreneurial 
persistence of informal liquor traders, with profits relatively easy to accrue for those 
willing to endure the risks of police harassment and prosecution, has resulted in 
continuation of the shebeen activities into the present. Above all, as we demonstrate, 
the proliferation of many small, home-based, micro-enterprises selling liquor reflects 
the highly localised nature of demand, where people are neither able nor willing to 
travel outside of their neighbourhoods to obtain liquor. 
After the fall of Apartheid, new regulations were intended to ‘normalise’ the liquor 
industry and bring shebeens within the formal regulatory framework. In 2003, a 
national liquor act was introduced (59 of 2003). The act placed the large scale 
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manufacturing and distribution of liquor under the jurisdiction of the national 
Ministry of Trade and Industry. However the regulation of retail trade is a provincial 
competency, with each province devising and implementing independent laws. 
Although provincial legislation must accord, in general terms, with the objectives of 
the national act, the act is ambiguous towards the position of shebeens. It merely 
expresses the need to provide opportunities in liquor retailing for historically 
excluded black entrepreneurs, whilst encouraging the extension of regulation to 
informal liquor retailing businesses. The act imposes no quantification to this 
position, which is significant as the national number of unlicensed liquor retailers 
certainly exceeds several hundred thousand (Charman 2006). 
The regulation of shebeens presents a paradox. Their inclusion within the regulatory 
framework would allow for the enforcement of trading conditions, including 
restrictions on under-age drinking and poor employment conditions. Yet their 
regulation would require the acceptance of their spatial location, as most are situated 
in the heart of residential areas of economically marginalised communities, where 
land use is deemed residential and commercial activities are commonly not 
permitted. It would also acknowledge acceptability of businesses that some interest 
groups question, given their religious, ideological, or personal aversion to alcohol. 
The issue of the regulation of shebeens has been debated in the context of a moral 
panic, where access to alcohol has been presented as a harbinger of crime, violence 
and social conflict (Parry & Dewing 2006). It is not surprising, therefore, that all 
provincial governments have, with varying degrees of intention, all chosen to exclude 
shebeens from the regulatory framework, restricting licences to formal business. The 
Western Cape Provincial Government has gone furthest amongst provinces in 
attempting to eradicate shebeens believing that their exclusion from the regulatory 
environment will reduce alcohol supply within poor communities. 
This policy stance rests on the assumption that policing can effectively reduce and 
eliminate informal liquor retailing. Between 1994 and 2009, official restrictions on 
unlicensed liquor trading were neither systematically nor rigorously enforced, with 
the authorities permitting shebeens to operate informally so long as the business 
operated responsibly without objection from the community (Charman, Piper and 
Petersen. forthcoming). The new Western Cape Liquor Act (No. 4 of 2008) greatly 
empowers the provincial government to intensify enforcement. This policy approach 
to liquor control has been closely observed by other provinces, who may implement 
similar measures to replicate the anticipated impact. As is shown below, to date this 
enforcement has been resisted and evasion continues, with the result that the story of 
shebeens is a story of enforced informalisation.  
5. Shebeens in Practice: Insights from Delft South, Cape Town 
As part of a larger study on informal micro-enterprises in five sites in the Western 
Cape and two sites in Gauteng, shebeens emerged as the most common enterprise in 
townships and informal settlements. In what follows we describe the nature of 
shebeening through a casestudy from one of our seven sites, namely Delft South in 
Cape Town. While the details are case-specific the general patterns and key findings 
are consistent across all the sites in which we have conducted fieldwork. More 
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specifically, the research has revealed, firstly, the significant number of shebeens in 
each site, indeed in almost every site they constitute the most common micro-
enterprise, usually followed by spaza shops and hair-care. The second key finding 
concerns a diversity and segmentation of types of shebeens, with the majority with 
trading less than 16 crates of beer (150 litres) a week. Third, were the linkages 
between shebeens, and not just the formal alcohol industry, but other informal 
enterprises that benefited from the presence of shebeens. Fourth, was the issue of 
licensing and police enforcement with only a small minority of larger shebeens even 
applying for licenses, but a widespread and often unpleasant experience of police 
enforcement. Each of these general points will be illustrated 
5.1 Delft South 
Delft South is part of a social project housing development located on the periphery 
of the City of Cape Town. The area comprises a residential population of 44,827 
persons (23,831 adults), living in 10,278 households1. About 61% of the working age 
population in Delft is not economically active. The Knowledge Factory data-set 
estimates that the monthly income per capita is R732, equating to an average 
household income of R2,928. Although the community of Delft is poor, most 
households occupy brick and mortar dwellings, whilst the community has a number 
of resources including parks (though most are in a state of disrepair), sports fields 
and facilities (several), libraries (two), health clinics (two), and a police station. Delft 
is spatially dislocated from formal business precincts of the city thus residents are 
commonly dependent on public transport to access employment or commercial 
enterprises. Delft South is home to a mixture of informal micro-enterprises providing 
services (such as hair care, car repairs) and trading goods (groceries, fast food, and 
clothing) – most of which originate from residential homes. 
The researchers conducted a census of all micro-enterprises in Delft South. The 
research approach was to traverse the area, street by street on bicycles, to identify 
businesses and record their geo-spatial location. The research methodology is 
described in Petersen et al. (forthcoming). All businesses that were evident and in 
operation, through signage and confirmation from residents were surveyed. 
Wherever the researchers encountered liquor retailers, a formal interview was 
undertaken with the owner upon their consent. The researchers specifically sought to 
identify all liquor retailers through consulting with distributors and local informants. 
Among those identified, the research questions explored enterprise history and 
characteristics, staff employment, infrastructure investments and facilities, and law 
enforcement impacts. The research was undertaken in December 2010 and May 
2011. The researchers mapped the distribution of businesses of different enterprise 
typologies to explore market dynamics and external influences. 
We subsequently sought to explore the qualitative dynamics through engaging with 
business owners in focus group discussions. Study participants were identified 
                                                          
1
 1Data supplied by Knowledge Factory. The data is modelled on the 2001 census and 2007 community survey 
(StatsSA). It is possible that these figures under-estimate the actual population. 
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through consulting with known representatives of liquor traders from three 
communities in which the authors had previously undertaken research on informal 
liquor retailing. The research sites were Atlantis (a coloured, working class 
community), Khayelitsha (a black, working class community), and greater Delft. All 
sites have high unemployment (above 50% of working age adults) and pressing 
developmental challenges. The focus group discussions were conducted over four 
hours at community centres at each site and participants were required to discuss 
and comment on particular concerns for the future of their business, both verbally 
and nonverbally, through completing questionnaires and recording specific points on 
cards for displaying under thematic headings. Through group discussions, the 
researchers sought to investigate the nature of individual business (history, current 
size and scope) the multiplier impacts on other micro-enterprises, coping 
mechanisms to closures (and law enforcement experiences) and their capacity to 
pursue alternative economic activities. 
5.2 Finding 1: The prevalence of shebeens 
The enterprise census in Delft South identified 818 micro-enterprises, of which 117 
sold liquor. The majority (71%) operated as shebeens, selling liquor for either off-
consumption or in on-consumption venues. We identified 18 spaza (grocery retail) 
shops that sold liquor and two micro-enterprises that brewed and sold traditional 
beer. Apart from spaza shops (190 in total), retail liquor businesses were the second 
most numerous business type in Delft South, representing 14.3% of all enterprises. 
This finding indicates that previous statistical estimations of the size of the informal 
liquor sector (accounting for 2.1% of selfemployment), using macro-data bases from 
StatsSA Labour Force Surveys are significantly under-reported (Wills 2009). 
Notably, in most of our other sites shebeens have been the most common form of 
micro-enterprise with spaza shops usually in second place. 
5.3 Finding 2: The diversity and segmentation of shebeens 
Considering all surveyed liquor retailing businesses, the research found considerable 
enterprise diversity. As evident from Figure 1, the spatial distribution of the 
identified businesses is even throughout the research site. There is no evidence of 
enterprise clustering in specific localities, while the influence of infrastructure such 
as high streets on business location is minor; this topic has been addressed in a 
separate paper (Charman, Petersen and Piper. forthcoming). The key point is that 
this suggests a localised form of demand with most shebeens servicing residents 
living within walking distance. 
Figure 1 
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Figure 1: Distribution of businesses selling liquor by category and volume of sales, Delft South and 
Eindhoven, May 2011 
 
In terms of retail types, about two thirds (65%) of the shebeens permit the 
consumption of liquor on the premises, while the remainder sell on a take-away or 
‘koop and loop’ 2 basis. 
The median length at which the enterprises were in business was 5.5 years, 
indicating significant longevity for those that survive start-up. Business ownership is 
divided roughly equally between men (52%) and women (48%), although more 
women tend to occupy the high volume category of shebeen while the men occupy 
more the medium volume category. 
In sum, there is some evidence for the popular notion of the ‘shebeen queen’ but only 
in the high volume category. This is illustrated in Figure 2, showing the position of 
women business owners across the three different businesses sizes discussed below. 
Figure 2 
                                                          
2
  Literally, ‘buy and walk’. 
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Figure 2: Informal liquor retail businesses by gender and enterprise size 
(beer sales-volume turnover), Delft South 
In order to differentiate shebeens by size, the researchers used beer sales in volume 
or weekly turnover. All the identified businesses sell bottled beer, though fewer sell 
Flavoured Alcohol Beverages (FAB) (94%), spirits (78%), wine (74%), and illicit 
concoctions (56%). Using the unit of a crate of beer (750ml x 12), the researchers 
disaggregated the businesses into three categories: one, businesses that sold less than 
16.5 crates per week (equivalent to the maximum level of liquor that an individual 
may possess under the new liquor act); two, businesses that sold between 16.5 and 65 
crates, which we considered mid volume sales; and three, those selling above 66 
crates, a volume benchmark at which liquor retailers could, once licensed, receive 
direct deliveries from liquor manufacturers. This is equal to one pallet of beer as 
carried by a forklift truck. 
This categorisation reveals that the majority of shebeens, 58%, sell less than 16.5 
crates of beer per week and are thus potentially much closer to being able to avoid 
the law than other enterprises, were the law to be relaxed on other grounds like land 
use zoning. Of the remaining 42% of shebeens, half (21%) are medium volume 
retailers and half (21%) are high-volume retailers. This differentiation reveals the 
common folly of lumping all shebeens together as the same kind of enterprise simply 
on the basis of their informality. What the statistics suggest is that most people run 
shebeens from a position of poverty and earn a modest living, while a significant 
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minority could potentially be seen as entrepreneurs and successful business people. 
This differentiation has direct implications for policy making in the sector. 
The scale of investment in liquor businesses and their leverage capacity was 
measured through four proxy indicators. We found that 64% of shebeens had 
branded fridges, 25% had a pool table, 23% had cable television and 12% had juke 
boxes. Branded fridges highlight strong linkages between informal liquor retailers 
and formal liquor marketing businesses.  
Eighty percent of licensed, on-consumption, venues in our sample had at least two of 
these indicators. These figures indicate that the majority of on-consumption venues 
do not conform to the stereotypical image of a tavern (pub); instead, most provide no 
form of entertainment, but merely offer a publicly accessible drinking space where 
drinking of liquor occurs. Whilst enterprise formalisation does enhance the capacity 
of informal liquor traders to invest within their business and secure services from 
formal businesses, our findings show that these investments are not preconditions 
for business success. 
5.4 Finding 3: Shebeen linkages and multiplying effects 
The economic significance of shebeens should be seen, not only in the linkages to 
formal alcohol manufacturing, but also in the context of business multipliers. 
According to a wide range of respondents, shebeens were widely held to benefit spaza 
and house shops (which sell cigarettes and soft drinks), fast food retailers and 
butchers (selling meat for street barbeques), recyclers (whom collect non-refundable 
glass bottles) and car-washes. According to respondents from our focus group, who 
typically ran much larger businesses, their enterprises had strong multiplier impacts 
on other informal enterprises and individuals. The participants (taken altogether) 
considered that the multiplier impact was greatest (in descending order) on spaza 
shops, ice suppliers, recycling businesses, car wash businesses, braai (barbeque) 
meat stands, house shops, wholesalers, hairdressers, informal financial lenders, 
neighbours, liquor wholesalers, butchery shops, phone shops, fast foods, private 
garages (for stock storage), street traders, security services and cigarette vendors. 
The multiplier influence obviously varies across these categories and within 
businesses providing these services, though the research confirms that the scale of 
the economic impact of informal liquor retailing correlates to business size, and in 
particular, on-consumption venues. This is important because one of the main 
coping strategies that these entrepreneurs intend utilising to minimize the risks of 
law enforcement is to downscale their visibility, turnover and reorganise the 
business, with clear negative implications for secondary consumption. Drawing on 
previous work that claims that shebeens have a multiplier effect on other businesses 
of a least 1.1 (Petersen and Charman 2010:106) this means that in Delft shebeens 
potentially supports a minimum of 129 additional businesses. In this site then, 
shebeens and their linked businesses constitute at least 30% of all identified 
microenterprises. 
5.5 Finding 4: Licensing and enforcement 
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Notably, of the 117 shebeens in Delft only 13 (11%) had obtained liquor licences and 
are legal taverns. A further 19 shebeeners had applied for liquor licences at the time 
of the fieldwork. Notably, 41% of all liquor retailers had made specific efforts to 
obtain a license, but the majority had not. Those businesses that had not applied for 
liquor licences included: a) newly established enterprises as well as those operating 
for less than 2 years (30%), b) poorly capitalised businesses, and c) businesses with a 
low volume turnover. In contrast, (i) long established traders whose (ii) business 
growth had enabled them to invest in the enterprise and raise sales volumes had (iii) 
generally received some level of industry or professional support in the liquor licence 
application process. Without this support (both financial and technical), the level of 
exclusion would undoubtedly be much higher. Hence, once again, a clear distinction 
emerges between a small number of big liquor business that are formalised and the 
vast majority of smaller liquor business that remain outside the law and policy. 
The sharpest evidence for this contrast is that 75% of the high volume outlets have 
obtained liquor licences, yet only 20% of medium volume outlets had licenses. 
Indeed only 50% per cent of the mid volume outlets had even applied for licences. 
This would indicate that enterprise size is relevant to formalisation, and that the 
incentives to formalise become more real when a business is doing more than 66 
creates a week and when, for example, direct deliveries would then improve 
efficiency. However, at least half of the identified high and medium volume 
businesses whose turnover is sufficient to warrant formalisation have chosen to 
remain informal and unlicensed. This statistic is important because enforcement is 
happening in Delft. Thus a remarkable 73% per cent of the respondents reported 
raiding by the police at least once over the preceding year, and on-consumption 
establishments were more severely targeted by law enforcement. Notably, the raiding 
of shebeens was consistent across all three enterprise size categories, showing that 
small volume traders carry as much risk as larger volume business of being subjected 
to arrest and prosecution, despite their differential impact of social and economic life 
of Delft. Of those raided, 91% were compelled to cease trading for a period of time, 
though all restarted their business within the same year. 
These figures suggest that law enforcement is a blunt, indiscriminate and ineffective 
tool to eradicate informal liquor retailing in Delft. Respondents spoke frankly of their 
experience of police raids. Sixteen reported that they had been raided and closed 
‘many times’, but refused to cease trading (Delft South, respondents 10, 15, 16, 17, 21, 
25, 36, 44, 46, 50, 56, 66, 68, 69, 70, 75). Police raids resulted in confiscation of 
property (pool tables and fridges) and stocks of liquor, the issuing of fines (up to 
R1500), and alleged thefts of takings. Delft South respondent 54 had been raided 
more than eight times and closed down more than five times, but vowed to continue 
trading. She remarked: ‘I have never been robbed by locals [people in the 
community] but has been robbed by the government through criminals wearing the 
badge of the police’. Another respondent, 70, reported having been raided 24 times, 
philosophically reflecting: ‘I know it is their duty to raid me once a week but it is also 
my duty to survive’. 
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She explained that she had ‘no choice but to continue [trading] because I am 
unemployed and need to find a source of income. This business is the only way I can 
put bread on the table and I don’t care if the business is legal or illegal I have a 
disabled child that depends on me. I am tired of the raids and want to get a liquor 
licence, but the condition of the licence demotivates me from applying’. One 
respondent (74) saw no particular obstacle from having been raided and temporarily 
closed; saying that despite these risks her business ‘was going well’. 
Some respondents had endeavoured to secure informal agreements with the police, 
though soon learnt that this did not guarantee immunity (Delft South respondent 
26). There was little sense in formalising, argued one respondent, because 
government expectations ‘are not only stupid but undermine the reasons that people 
have gone into shebeening [sic] in the first place, to make money’ (Delft South, 
informant 34). In contrast, some participants spoke of their endeavours to formalise 
by investing in lawyers (between R4000-R8000) and other service providers to 
guide their application through the necessary channels (Delft South, respondent 37, 
50). In the case of some of the smallest businesses, their entry into the liquor market 
was forced upon them by the failure of their spaza in competition with newly arrived 
immigrant shop keepers (Delft South, respondent 14) (see Charman, Petersen & 
Piper 2012). 
In order to survive, several of these spaza enterprises had resorted to selling liquor. 
There was a general complaint that whilst informal liquor businesses sell a formally 
manufactured and legal product, they are raided and their businesses harassed, 
whilst drug dealers who sell illegal products are ignored. As one Delft respondent 
(25) argued ‘we feel like criminals, but people who sell drugs and dagga (marijuana) 
have more freedom’ (also Khayelitsha respondents 21, 26). Police corruption and 
favouritism in the application of the law was a reoccurring theme in each of the focus 
group discussions; as one respondent put it (Atlantis, 11) if you ‘know them then it’s 
ok, but if you don’t then you will be fucked up’. Or said more politely, ‘police have 
been very partial to specific traders with whom they have “dealings”’ (Atlantis 
respondent, 43). Amongst the Khayelitsha focus group cohorts, 62% 
had personal experience of either police corruption or police theft. The reported high 
incidence of police corruption possibly explains why shebeens are able continue 
operations despite the policing risks. Notably, 34% of Khayelitsha respondents said 
that they would simply ignore the law and continue trading as before. 
A considerable number of respondents in the Delft and Atlantis workshops said that 
if the state enforced business closure, they would respond by engaging in criminal 
activity such as selling drugs (8% overall). In both communities there is an 
established drug culture with apparent growing demand for crystal 
methamphetamine. For some, this intention is not theoretical, as an Atlantis 
respondent (13) reflected: ‘when I moved to Atlantis from Elsies River I sold drugs. I 
went to prison for seven years. Now I have a [legitimate] business and I apply for a 
liquor licence, but government puts obstacles in my way’. For most respondents, the 
need for economic survival was their paramount consideration, not that people 
particularly desired to sell drugs, but that drug dealing was seen as an option given 
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that there is ‘no other work’, ‘factories are closing’, ‘I am too old for other work’ and 
‘foreigners are taking away our business’ (respectively Atlantis respondents, 6, 23, 41 
and 40). 
 
The main coping response, as emerged from the workshop and confirmed in the 
Delft South field research, was to downscale enterprise size, operate with a smaller 
turnover and reduce trading hours to minimize risk impact. Twenty five of the 32 
participants at the Delft focus group reported downsizing their turnover, some by as 
much as 90% of volume sales. This downsizing also affected the kinds of liquor sold 
with a decrease in high value/volume stock items, and reduced the number of 
employees. They also reported ordering stock in smaller quantities but more 
frequently. The loss of employment opportunities is significant because these larger 
size businesses are providers of informal employment. Among the three cohorts of 
focus group respondents, informal liquor retailing business in Delft, Atlantis and 
Khayelitsha provide full-time work (on average) to 3.7, 3.2 and 3.1 workers per 
business respectively. If the size of the shebeen sector is as large as thought, then 
these larger informal liquor traders (20% of the total) potentially account for 
150,000 direct jobs across South Africa. The re-organisation of supply chains is also 
noteworthy. The strategy of purchasing small volumes, through increasing the 
frequency of purchases, has been one of the main risk reduction measures among 
small volume shebeens, enabling the enterprise to rapidly recover from police raids 
and stock confiscation. But for larger businesses, this strategy would prevent them 
from forging business relationships with formal enterprises to obtain direct delivery 
or bulk discounts, for example. The outcome of these evasive coping responses is the 
deepening of informality, whereby small businesses operate clandestinely, separated 
in business from the formal sector and increasingly attracted to informal supply 
chains and products. The Western Cape’s documented growth in illegally produced 
alcoholic concoctions is evidence of these trends. 
6. Conclusions 
Kanbur’s (2012) notional idea that informality endures due to a lack of enforcement 
simply does not apply in the case of informal alcohol retailing through shebeens in 
the townships and informal settlements of South Africa. As illustrated by the 
example of Delft South in Cape Town, and confirmed by our findings in six other 
research sites across the country, substantial policing has neither induced substantial 
numbers of shebeens to become licensed or substantial numbers to avoid the law. 
Instead, the vast majority of shebeens have embraced more subtle tactics of evasion, 
including treating state enforcement as a necessary, if evil, business cost. To put it 
another way, the informal economy in alcohol exists because of state policies – it is a 
case of enforced informalisation. 
The reason for this, we would suggest, is the failure to align law and policy with the 
reality of the lived economy in poor communities. Although in theory shebeens could 
formalise, the current legal requirements are too stringent for the vast majority of 
traders whose small turnover and modest profits do not justify the direct and indirect 
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costs of navigating a complicated formal system for licensing. This larger group 
simply accept that their business activity and livelihoods will likely undergo 
increased police harassment. The costs of stock confiscation, fining and corruption 
simply become (unpredictable) business expenses, which are managed through 
evasive strategy and tactics. For a small minority of large-scale entrepreneurs, 
formalisation appears to offer greater incentives and they are thus more likely to 
apply. However, it is notable that despite the greater likelihood of compliance by 
larger shebeens, and their more significant economic and social impact, reports of 
police raiding in this site were consistent across enterprise type. The blunt and 
undifferentiated application of enforcement confirms the main intention of policy is 
to close shebeens altogether rather than formalise them. 
There are also indirect but obviously harmful consequences to enforcement, not least 
of which is the criminalisation of poor people trying to make a living; the inclination 
of those who can no longer run shebeens to turn to more obviously criminal 
activities; and the creation of conditions for corruption by, and of, police officers. 
Indeed, instead of reducing informality the current approach seems more likely to 
enhance it while breeding more criminality, thus achieving a “perfect storm” of 
unintended consequences. Quite simply, the intentions and outcomes of enforcement 
are diametrically opposed in a context where relations between the state and the 
poor in South Africa are at their lowest ebb since 1994, as illustrated by the rising 
wave of militant and violent action by communities and miners over the last year. 
Lastly, the diversity of shebeens reminds us that the notion of the ‘informal’ is a 
residual conceptual category, and that there are potentially significant divisions 
between those how who could be seen as successful business people or entrepreneurs 
and those who operate in a more ‘survivalist’ or marginal way. This suggests that a 
policy framework and practice is possible that distinguishes the ‘entrepreneur’ from 
the ‘survivalist’ and looks to include the former in the formal system while allowing 
the survivalist to avoid criminalisation. If correct, this analysis suggests that 
informality in the shebeen sector is, in significant part, a political and policy issue, 
and that even if these policy issues were addressed, around at least half of the 
shebeener population would likely remain operating in survivalist mode in the 
absence of more meaningful opportunities, and continue trying to run a their small 
businesses under the state’s radar. To put the point more bluntly, you cannot solve 
the ‘shebeen problem’ through a policy approach based on law enforcement. 
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